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The aim of this study is to investigate whether past experience affects ones altruism. Does 
having been poor makes a person more altruistic when rich, does her concept of fairness 
change as it gets richer? An adaption of the classic Public Goods Game with heterogeneous 
endowments was used for the purpose.  
Keywords: Experience; Altruism; Heterogeneous Public Goods Game. 
 3 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Thank you to both universities involved for giving me the opportunity of doing my Masters 
in not one but two highly reputable institutions.  
Thank you to Jona Linde and Alexander Coutts, as this thesis wouldn’t be possible without 
their guidance and commitment.  
Thank you to the loved ones for the companionship and support given.  
 4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... 2 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................... 3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... 4 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 5 
Background and Literature Review ........................................................................................ 7 
Experimental Design ............................................................................................................ 11 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 13 
Results .................................................................................................................................. 16 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 19 
Appendix 1: Instructions page given to the participants in the experiment (2 pages) .......... 21 
Appendix 2: Survey instructions .......................................................................................... 23 





This paper was written with the objective of understanding the relation between a rich 
persons past experience with their current donations, using a modified version of the Public 
Goods Game in order to create a social experiment in which some of the participants may 
start out as the poorest at the table, and become the richest, having to donate tokens to the 
public pot during the two phases. Investigation will be made by comparing the behavior of 
players with fixed roles to those with varying roles. A more detailed explanation on the 
framework will later follow. While applying this experiment, further analysis can be made 
concerning the impact of enrichment or impoverishment of the participants in their 
donations, with comparison to other participants with constant endowment.  
Behavioral Game Theory has demonstrated to be an efficient approach in showing these 
concerns, by analyzing strategic choices using simple games. One of those games is the 
Public Goods Game. 
In its most basic form, everyone starts out with the same number of tokens, and each player 
secretly chooses how many tokens to donate to a public pot. This pot is then multiplied by a 
factor (greater than one and lower than the number of players) and evenly divided between 
every player, regardless of their donations. Each player also keeps the tokens they did not 
contribute.  
Although quite interesting, a game where every player begins with the same endowment is 
not reflective of our society where, due to countless factors, people have different amounts 
of wealth. It is quite common for the wealthier members of the society to donate to the 
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meager ones and, if we exclude the “self interested donators”, we can testify the presence 
of altruism and care for the greater well being of society. In some cases, these donators are 
people who have somehow experienced a life much different than the one they live now, 
and there are multiple cases of self made people donating huge amounts of money to people 
living the same struggles they have once lived.  
Evidence indicates that a large proportion of people act not only on their self interest, but 
also with concern for the well being of others. Concerns for fairness, reciprocity and the 
overall well being of others are quite common, and have been proven to have important 
economic consequences [Fehr and Schmidt (2006)]. Having gone through another’s 




Background and Literature Review 
The Public Goods game is amongst the best known experiments in economics. It is meant 
to mimic everyday behaviors in multiple situations. Economists such as Ledyard (1995) or 
Ostrom (2000) have studied its intricacies and limitations, and current social economists 
use it as a tool to measure social norms and preferences [Camerer and Fehr (2003); Bayer et 
al. (2010)].  
Rational choice theory states that, in an environment with voluntary provision of a public 
good, people will free ride. There is indeed a dominant strategy of every player donating 
zero tokens to the pot, making it a Nash Equilibrium. However, this outcome has rarely 
been seen in experiments, as most people do not free ride, making positive contributions 
[Ledyard (1995); Ostrom (2000)].  
Different theories have been put forward regarding this behavior, whether related to the 
concepts of fairness and reciprocity [Rabin (1993); Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Fehr and 
Gachter (2000)]; or to the possibility that such behavior occurs from self interest [Baik et 
al. (1999); Hoffman et al. (1994); Forsythe et al. (1994)]. 
Regarding heterogeneous endowments in linear public goods game, there are a number of 
studies that have found contradictory results. 
 Hofmeyr et al. (2007) find no impact of endowment heterogeneity on the overall 
contributions level, nor on each players contribution as a proportion of their endowment 
(“fair share rule”). Likewise, Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) also observe a lack of influence of 
the skew of inequality on the contributions level in prolonged Public Goods games (where 
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endowments are dynamic, as players are given their earnings every round). In contrast, 
Cherry et al. (2005) performed the classic linear Public Goods game, with only one round, 
where subjects’ endowments were retrieved by their performance on a GMAT like quiz, 
thus creating heterogeneity. Results were then compared with similar experiments on 
homogeneous groups. In heterogeneous groups, subjects contributed significantly less to 
the public good than those in groups with homogeneous endowments, being reciprocity one 
of the main reasons, since a subject with high endowment does not contribute a higher than 
average amount, as she knows that the others, having smaller endowments, won’t 
reciprocate.  
Buckley and Croson (2006), in their linear public good experiment with heterogeneous 
endowments, observe that the poorest players donate the same absolute amount, meaning a 
bigger proportion than the richer players. 
Van Dijk and Wilke (1994) have performed a single round public good experiment with 
heterogeneous endowments, and found that the more endowment a player has, the more she 
will contribute (“noblesse oblige”). However, and unlike Cherry et al. (2005), who had 
found no impact of wealth origin on donations, they detected that contributions are 
influenced by whether endowments have been randomly distributed or allocated through 
some process which may differ players’ capacities or abilities in certain tasks, or that 
require unequal amounts of time. In this case, the difference between poor and rich players’ 
donations is significantly larger.  Van Dijk and Wilke’s experiment is similar to the one this 
paper proposes, and their conclusions are remarkable, as having your endowment being 
dependent on performance brings up a different approach on fairness, where merit and 
reward play an important role.  
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A different, yet quite interesting approach was used in Georgantzís (2011) research, as 
subjects were questioned on their belief of their relative financial position (Rich, Poor, 
neither), and also their parents income (subjects were all students), and then randomly 
allocating either a small or a big endowment, in order to form groups with two poor and 
two rich subjects. Georgantzís, unlike previous studies, concluded that heterogeneity has a 
positive effect on both absolute and relative contributions. Georgantzis also found that, by 
retrieving subjects’ beliefs on each other, it is expected that players on the opposite type, 
regardless of each, will contribute more. 
Reuben (2012) focuses on the enforcement of contribution norms in public goods games, 
and his approach is guided towards punishment based games, which deviates from the topic 
of this paper. However, this study has found no influence of endowment heterogeneity in 
any contribution norm, other than the expected tendency to free riding as more rounds are 
played.  
Keser et al. (2014) perform a linear public goods game of 25 rounds, with the exception 
that players do not know each other’s endowments. Results show that, as asymmetry in 
endowments strengthens, contributions decrease significantly, so that, when there is a super 
rich player in the table, she is not interested in achieving the social optimum. 
Evidence, although somewhat contradictory, does seem to support the tendency for games 
with heterogeneous endowments having worse social outcomes [Ledyard (1995)], as every 
player donates less. Experimental research has shown that it is often the richest player who 
is primarily responsible for the lack of contributions.  
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These studies however, to the extent of my knowledge, have been purely focused on the 
analysis of constantly rich/poor players. In contrast, this thesis is concerned with the 
creation of a game where players go through different endowments, where the previously 
poorest player can now play the game whilst being the richest, providing the basis for an 
evaluation of whether he follows the norm of donating proportionally less, or, due to his 
previous rounds as the poor player, becomes a more altruistic rich player. Similarly, it 
provides an opportunity to investigate if a previously rich player, when becoming poor, will 
keep donating proportionally less as when he was rich, or will he understand the social 
benefit of having everyone donating bigger proportions of their endowments, and thus 
contribute for a more socially desirable outcome.  
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Experimental Design  
Subjects shall be divided into groups of 4, and then, in each group, players will be 
randomly assigned 3 possible roles, and their respective endowments, forming the 
following set: 1 Rich (25 tokens), 1 Poor (5 tokens), and 2 average (15 tokens). Subjects 
shall not talk to each other before or during the experiment, as to avoid emotional bias, but 
they can see each others’ role and endowment.  
A one shot linear public good game is then performed, where each player donates an 
amount of their endowment to the public pot, which will be doubled and then evenly shared 
between all 4 players, whether they have donated or not. Donations shall be made public, as 
to avoid contradictory or mixed beliefs. However, making donations public does allow for 
impure altruism effect [Andreoni (1990)].   
Now in order to restructure groups there are two main solutions. One is to sit each player 
with three different people, and again randomize their roles. This method would be very 
costly, as many samples would be needed in order to gather a sufficient number of players 
who had been poor and then rich, and vice versa. It would however allow for interesting 
follow up research, since all possible role transactions would occur and be motivating to 
study upon.  
A less costly solution would be to have the poor and rich players from the first stage swap 
roles with each other, sit in different tables, and get 3 new randomly assigned subjects to 
perform another one shot game.  This group restructuring may however encourage 
retaliatory actions, since the previously poor now rich player could form the correct belief 
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that the poor player sitting at his table had been rich before, and hadn’t donated enough 
tokens in the first stage.  
 
Now, it is important to mention the decay that repetition has on donations (see Fischbacher 
and Gachter (2010) for an updated and extended reference list of articles where an increase 
in free riding over time is reported), which may distort the outcome of the experiment. In 
order to control for this effect, base groups where people do not change roles (but do 
change partners) will form the relevant comparison groups. Base groups would only need to 
be created if the cheapest group restructuring solution was applied (since in the costliest 
solution it would be possible to find data within the sample where subjects were constantly 
rich/poor), but it would still increase the costs of the experiment.  
It is also worth mentioning how income effects may play a role in the players’ behavior in 
the second round. It is possible that players may alter their behavior not resulting from 





For the purpose of controlling for player’s beliefs and consequent punishing actions, we 
shall assume that group restructuring for the second stage was made with randomly 
assigned roles. 
The main focus of this experiment is the decision making process of the first stage poor/ 
second stage rich player (and, in extension, both of the remaining enrichment possibilities: 
1
st
 stage poor, 2
nd




 rich). Observing whether she becomes 
more altruistic than the constantly rich player, benefiting the social wellbeing; or whether 
she becomes selfish once rich, and punishes society for the potential lack of altruism shown 
towards her in the 1
st
 stage. However, it is also quite interesting to analyze the other 
players’ actions. Observing how the players who have suffered an endowment lost - 
especially the ones who went from richest to poorest - react and feel towards the group 
social wellbeing can prove to be a very interesting way to study the behavior of individuals 
who suddenly lose a great amount of wealth and now have to experience a different 
approach when facing society.   
These are the hypotheses that can be tested in this experiment: 
 
1. A player who has enriched is more altruistic than 1st stage rich player, donating 
more thus providing for social wellbeing, or does he donate less. This is the main 
research question of this thesis, and what should be prioritized when analyzing the 
results of the experiment. If a great number of 2
nd
 staged enriched players donate 
more (decay effects aside for simplicity) than a constantly rich player, and if this 
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past experience is shown to be significant for the player’s future donations, then we 
are closer to demonstrating the importance of enriched donators to society.   
On the other hand, if the enriched player shows no increase in donations in 
comparison to the constantly rich, future research can be made concerning how 
endowment affects a player’s view on equality and altruism, as it is possible that a 
player, even when poor, doesn’t believe that the richer players should help him. 
 
2. A player who has been impoverished continues to donate a small proportion of his 
endowment or does he increase his social awareness and consequently his 
donations. Now it is important to check wheter the impoverished player, wasn’t 
simply altruistic in the first stage, when he was richer. Having that established, 
observing if an impoverished player changes his attitude towards the game and 
social wellbeing is quite interesting, but it is possible that impure altruism is shown 
in order to increase the player’s revenue. On the other hand, and considering the 
main focus of this thesis, it is also possible that an impoverished player who has 
donated few tokens in the first stage, regrets doing so after experiencing what it is 
like to be the poorest player.  
                                                                                                                  
3. How do constantly average players behave, do they contribute or do they expect the 
rich player to do so. This hypothesis can be restated as the players’ opinion on 
whose task is it of looking out for the poorer players: the richest or everyone’s. 
Whether constantly average players are more altruistic or not can be analyzed as the 
average altruism of the population, since there is no past experience with different 
endowments or with the participants at the table. 
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Considering the uniqueness of the research question of this paper, the consequential lack of 
literature regarding experience and altruism, and the fact that this design was unable to be 
tested in an ideal setting, it is a rather complicated task to predict the player’s behavior. 
However, in an almost “Lockesque” manner, I believe that knowledge comes from 
experience, and having been trough poverty makes one more understanding of  the social 
benefits of the richer players donations, and, having the opportunity of being that richer 





In order to collect data, I have created an online survey (using Qualtrics) where I 
thoroughly explained the rules of the public goods game and the heterogeneous 
endowments’ adaptation described in this thesis (see appendix 2 for the instructions given). 
Participants were then randomly allocated either 5€ or 25€ (Since a small number of 
participants was expected, the 15€ endowment was removed but the participants were not 
aware of this removal, as to continue assuming there were two average players in their 
“table”). Two rounds were made.  
However, since it is an online survey and not the actual experiment, there are some pitfalls 
with this kind of data gathering:  
a) The absence of real monetary outcomes, which will inevitably allow for a much 
greater sense of altruism, since players will more often act on what they assume 
to be the correct thing to do, since there are no real costs in doing so.  
b) Although explained, participants did not get to know their outcomes in the end 
of each round, since they were not actually playing the game with each other, 
but merely asked on how much would they donate/keep considering the 
endowment allocated to them. The lack of a real grasp on the game might distort 
the answers given.  
In total there were 91 responses. I imported the answers to Stata and organized the data into 
the following variables:  
 contribution1 (proportion of endowment donated in the first round)  
 contribution2 (proportion of endowment donated in the second round) 
 constpoor (dummy variable, 1 if player had 5€ in both rounds, 0 otherwise) 
 constrich (dummy variable, 1 if player had 25€ in both rounds, 0 otherwise) 
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 enriched (dummy variable, 1 if player had 5€ and 25€ in the first and second, respectively, and 0 
otherwise) 
 impoverished (dummy variable, 1 if player had 25€ and 5€ in the first and second, respectively, and 
0 otherwise) 
 
As shown below in figure I, a linear regression was then performed using contribution2 as 
the independent variable which brought up interesting results. From the survey responses, it 
seems that enriched people actually donate proportionately less in the second round that 
constantly rich players donate in both rounds. Moreover, being enriched leads to a 
statistically significant 24 percentage point decrease in contributions relative to being 
constantly poor. Not so surprisingly, but also significant, players who have donated a 
higher proportion of their endowment in the first round will also donate higher proportions 
in the second round.  
 
Figure I - Linear Regression of survey data 
 
These conclusions seem to go against my original prediction, which, survey flaws aside, 
may have some interesting interpretation to it.  Perhaps being accustomed to having larger 
endowments makes one more altruistic, as opposed to someone who suddenly earns a lot of 
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money and therefore is more tempted to keep it than to donate it. This last sentence brings 
me to another issue that both the survey and the actual experiment may have. It seems 
reasonable that enriched people may not become highly altruistic at the moment they 
become richer, meaning that it is possible that they will, as predicted, be more altruistic 
than constantly rich people, but not immediately after becoming rich, and especially not 
after having earned their endowment on a random basis (and in the survey case, without 
even having palpable outcomes). Evidently, these are the main limitation of a social 
experiment when in comparison with real life, where enriched people often struggle when 
poor and work hard to become rich, and do so gradually, implying a greater 




The mechanism design provided in this paper is expected to be able to better understand the 
impact of experiencing poverty in a player’s altruism. Studying several papers referring to 
Public Goods games, particularly ones with heterogeneous endowments, and referring to its 
conclusions, it was possible to formulate all the possible outcomes this mechanism design 
may lead to, and the consequences of such outcomes. A personal prediction of the outcome 
of the experiment was then added. 
Focusing on the enriched player, the possibility of her being more altruist than a constantly 
rich player allows for a wider analysis on how society and wealth distribution work 
nowadays. However, data gathered through a survey seemed to point otherwise, as enriched 
participants donated proportionately less than the constantly rich ones. Limitations of both 
the survey and the experiment were also covered in this paper.  
Interestingly, according to the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief reports, the annual 
incomes of the wealthiest 100 people in the world could end global poverty four times over. 
Maybe if those people had gone through scarcity themselves they would be more 
understanding and helpful towards the end of extreme poverty.  
As seen in the survey results, there is also the risk that the previously poor player, once 
rich, will donate the same (or even less) as the constantly rich player. This could be 
interpreted in two ways:  it could show the effect money has on a person’s mentality 
towards altruism and social wellbeing; but it could also mean that the population on which 
the experiment was tested doesn’t believe in equity, and doesn’t believe that the poorest 
should be helped by the richest [See Baumard (2013)].  
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The results of the experiment, if significant, could affect policy making in fund raising. One 
of the most implemented strategies is to awe people using images, testimonies or reports 
about extreme poverty. This sort of campaign is often misguided, as constantly rich people 
may not feel devoted to the cause, since it may be too far and distinct for them to fully 
acknowledge and care about. Perhaps policy makers in this field should focus on rich 
people with poorer backgrounds, and instead of stunning people with the most extreme 
cases of poverty, an approach where possible donators felt closer and more related to would 
be more effective.   
Now, a different strategy shall be used to attract possible donators who have always been 
wealthy, as they are less likely to donate based on self familiarization with poverty. Perhaps 
it is possible to implement such policy in where people have to somehow experience a sub 
optimal living, in order to further relate to the cause, and possibly donate more.  
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Appendix 1: Instructions page given to the participants in the experiment 
(2 pages) 
 
Today you will be playing the Public Goods Game, a standard game in experimental 
economics. Read and follow the instructions carefully.   
You will be seated with 3 different people who have received the same instructions page as 
you.  
You will be randomly assigned with 5, 15 or 25 tokens.  
You will then decide how many of your tokens to keep, and how many to donate to the 
public pot, by writing your allocation on the answer sheet given to you. The sum of the 
tokens you keep and the ones you donate should be exactly equal to the number of tokens 
you were assigned with.  
 
You shall be granted the tokens you keep for yourself. The tokens you and the other players 
at your table have donated are to be added together doubled and then equally shared 
amongst the four of you.  
 
Under any circumstance shall you speak to other participants in the experiment.  








b) Tokens donated: _____ 
c) Tokens kept: _____ 
d) Tokens received from the pot: _____ 
 
 




b) Tokens donated: _____ 
c) Tokens kept: _____ 
d) Tokens received from the pot: _____ 
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Appendix 2: Survey instructions 
Intro: Thank you very much for participating in this survey! 
 
It will be a very short (two questions) questionnaire about money allocation choices in an 
hypothetical situation, to which I ask you to try and act as if it was your own.  
 
Please read carefully in order to fully understand the scenario, as it makes it much easier 
and faster to then answer the questions. 
 
Set up: Imagine you are seated it with three other people who you have never met before.   
You are given a random amount of money out of three possible options, forming the 
following set: One of you has 5€, two of you have 15€, and the last one has 25€.  
 
Each of you must decide how much money you want to keep, and how much you want to 
donate into a public pot.  
  
You shall be granted the money you keep for yourself. The money you and the other 
players at your table have put into the pot are doubled and then equally shared amongst the 
four of you.  
 
You will be asked to play this game twice.  
 
Here are four examples of how the game works: 
 
Example 1: If everyone puts all their money (5+15+15+25=60€) in the pot, then everyone 
leaves the table with an amount of 30€ (Pot is doubled so turns into 120€, then divided by 
four people.)  
 
Example 2: If everyone puts all their money except the first player, which contributes 
nothing. Pot has 55€, which turn into 110€, giving 27,5€ to each player. This will be the 
final outcome of the three players who have donated, whilst the person who didnt donate 
will have his initial 5€ plus the 27,5€ from the pot, ending with 32,5€.  
 
Example 3: If everyone puts all their money except the last player, which contributes 
nothing. Pot has 35€, which turn into 70, giving 17,5€ to each player. This will be the final 
outcome of the three players who have donated, whilst the person who didnt donate will 
have his initial 25€ plus the 17,5€ from the pot, ending with 42,5€.  
 
Example 4: If everyone puts 5€ in the pot and keeps the rest. Pot has 20€, get doubled and 
turns to 40€, meaning everyone gets 10€, plus what they kept. (10€ for first, 20€ for the 
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